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DRAFTSMAN: FORMULATION OF POLICY
Carl Schier*
I. Introduction
Most low income families rent their living accommodations; for them the
lease arrangement is a precarious one at best. It is generally a periodic
tenancy from week to week or month to month with the agreement rarely
reduced to writing. If the allocation of rights and duties between the
parties is spelled out by them at all, it is quite one-sided and normally
delineates only what the tenant may and may not do. When there is no
written agreement or when the writing is silent as to the obligations of the
parties, the common law of landlord and tenant controls, leaving the land-
lord in a position of near absolute control over his tenant. The premises
conveyed under a lease are of uniformly low quality. Buildings are old and
facilities supplying heat, light, and water are badly in need of repair or
replacement. Rents, however, are uniformly high, a circumstance which
results from heavy demand in a market of extremely short supply. Given
that the low income family must lease its housing accommodations in the
private market where the quality is poor and the supply is limited, the
question is whether law reform can be expected to work a substantial
change.
The law reform accomplished in Michigan in 1968 was begun by
limiting the legal frame of reference in the hope that the impact of reform
could be maximized. The framework for Michigan reform was limited to
two areas: first, the law of landlord and tenant since that law governed
nearly all relationships between buyers and sellers of housing accommoda-
tions; second, the law of environmental control, such as housing codes and
other health and safety laws, which was to be clarified and in some
measure integrated with landlord-tenant law. Realistic goals were stated
within this limited legal framework. First, the tenant must have sufficient
space for the comfort and convenience of himself and his family. Second,
the term of occupancy should be long enough that the tenant is assured
some degree of permanency. Third, the premises must be maintained in
a safe and sanitary condition. Fourth, basic services, such as heat, light,
and water, must be provided in sufficient quantity and quality to meet
normal needs. And fifth, the price to be paid by the tenant for the
premises and the attendant services should reflect his ability to pay in some
measure. A more encompassing goal was to alter the balance of power in
the lease relationship so that the tenant might assume some responsiblity
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and control in matters fundamental to his well-being. If the tenant had the
leverage to force his landlord to bargain, he could compel the commitment
of more money to improve the quality of existing housing. There would
be no limit on the nature and variety of beneficial considerations which
he could extract with his bargaining leverage.
Prior to 1968 no support for efforts to achieve these goals could be
found in the law. No coherent, unified body of substantive law governed
the various relationships arising out of the occupation of multiple dwellings.
The law was rather a patchwork enforced through actions brought by the
parties to the lease. Even the code law governing environmental control
was unclear in its relationship to the tenant and was enforced by a local
governmental officer. The substantive law did not recognize rights which
tenants claimed to be theirs in the natural order of things, as for example
the right of a person with a large family to have space sufficient to his
needs made available to him at a reasonable cost. More importantly,
perhaps, acknowledged rights could not be secured through existing
remedies. A tenant, convinced that he had been evicted as a result of his
lawful complaints to local building officials about code violations on the
premises, was not permitted to present evidence of the wrongful nature
of the eviction by way of defense. Relief often depended solely on the
control exercised by a local official charged with the enforcement of a
housing code or other health ordinance. As a matter in the official's
discretion, enforcement was often based on considerations other than the
needs of those the law was intended to benefit.
II. Summary of Proposed Bills
In the 1968 Regular Session the Michigan Legislature enacted six bills,
popularly known as the Tenants' Rights package.l The bills were drafted
to interlock, and they complement one another in establishing remedies.
One bill amended the State Housing Law, which had been adopted in
1917, by substituting a new enforcement section. 2 Although the objectives
of this ancient law were inappropriate for urban renewal and its standards
hopelessly antiquated, the amendment was directed at the woefully in-
adequate enforcement provisions because wholesale revision of the code
had failed to pass the Legislature in previous years. The general mainte-
nance sections of the code, if properly enforced, were thought to offer
adequate relief to low income tenants in most instances. A second bill
altered the general rule that the tenant accepts leased premises as he finds
them, imposing on the landlord an obligation to put the premises in a
1H. 3188, providing for new code enforcement procedures; H. 3395, establishing
covenants of fitness and repair; H. 3397, requiring just cause for eviction from
public housing; H. 3396, creating a Board of Tenants Affairs; H. 3384, amending
the summary possession law; S. 804, the open occupancy and fair housing law.
2 P. A. 1968, No. 286.
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condition fit for habitation prior to the tenant's taking possession and an
obligation to maintain the leased premises throughout the term of occupa-
tion. 3 Covenants to this effect were to be read into every lease or license
of residential premises as a matter of statutory law.
To prohibit the termination of tenancy in public housing without reason,
the third bill provided that no tenancy could be terminated except for
just cause.4 Illustrative reasons that would satisfy the requirement of just
cause were provided in the bill. A fourth bill provided for the creation of
tenants' councils in any community that operated public housing projects
or facilities, although the bill as enacted was limited in its application to
the city of Detroit. 5 These councils were given the power to control
relations between tenants and project management. The fifth bill amended
the state's summary possession law, creating a variety of defenses to an
action for possession and liberalizing the provisions requiring an excessive
bond on appeal. 6 The final bill, perhaps symbolically most important,
was the fair housing or open occupancy bill.7
III. Housing Code Enforcement
The most striking aspect of the amendments to the enforcement article
of the state housing law is that the proposed changes were intended more
to clarify and to elaborate on existing procedures than to establish an
entirely new mode of enforcement. Significant innovations were adopted,
but the greatest single accomplishment was to indicate in detail the variety
of enforcement remedies long ignored by local officials.
A. Prior Law
The pre-1968 enforcement sections contained a skeleton procedure
consisting of two parts. Various administrative functions performed by
officials at the local level, such as the health inspector or a building
inspection engineer, make up the first part. The formal and informal
procedures used by inspectors are sufficient in most cases to secure
compliance. The second part consists of formal procedures leading to
compliance orders issued by hearing boards or courts and backed by the
threat of contempt citations or criminal prosecution.
The old procedures included registration and indexing of the names of
owners of buildings and their agents, periodic inspections, entry upon
premises, issuance of certificates of compliance, and issuance of notices of
violation and orders to comply. If, following inspection, a notice of
violation and an order to correct did not result in compliance, the en-
3 P. A. 1968, No. 295.
4 P. A. 1968, No. 267.
5 P. A. 1968, No. 344.
6 P. A. 1968, No. 292.
7 p. A. 1968, No. 112.
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forcing official was given four alternatives: to seek a misdemeanor con-
viction under the statute; to bring an action for recovery of a "civil
penalty"; to bring an action for an injunction or other equitable relief; or
to have the violations corrected and obtain a lien against the real property
for the costs. Where fines or penalties were left unpaid, liens could be
obtained by proper recording of the judgment in the civil or criminal
action.
Enforcement was not solely the province of local officials. Some
language in the act suggested that an occupant in a multiple dwelling
might bring an action to enforce the act, while a self-help provision per-
mitted the withholding of rent where certificates of compliance had not
been obtained. Although the arsenal of remedial weapons in the hands of
the local enforcing official thus seemed adequate in even the most difficult
situations, the grants of power were either ineptly drawn or circumscribed
by such limitations as to emasculate them effectively. This is unfortunately
characteristic of enactments which purport to exercise or delegate powers
which protect public health, safety, morals and the general welfare.
Whether the limitations were the product of inadvertence or design is
unclear, but their existence could not be disputed. The provisions for
registering and indexing the names of owners and agents were not ac-
companied by any requirement that records be kept with regard to such
matters as the number of inspections, the number of violations, the
anticipated time for compliance, or estimated costs. The section providing
for the right of entry by enforcement officials was limited only in that
inspections were to be undertaken at reasonable hours. No provision was
made for a warrant procedure as required by recent Supreme Court de-
cisions.8 The procedure for noting violations and ordering corrections
gave no direction to enforcing officials. The statute merely stated that
"every notice or order in relation to a dwelling shall be served five days
before the time for doing the thing in relation to which it shall have been
issued." Doing one's "thing" on five days notice might be difficult at times,
especially if the "thing" were the replacement of plumbing or heating
facilities. In addition to allowing a reasonable time for compliance, the
notice had to state the date of the inspection, the name of the inspector,
and the sections of the law that were violated.
The certificate of compliance under the old law had an impact only upon
new construction and buildings converted into dwellings. It issued only
once prior to first occupancy as a condition precedent to lawful occupa-
tion of the building. Had it been given continuing legal effect and made
subject to revocation or suspension where conditions warranted, it could
have been a useful enforcement device. The single self-help provision
which permitted rent withholding was dependent on the status of the
S Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S.
523 (1966); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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certificate of compliance, for rent could be withheld only when the
certificate had not been issued. Yet since the certificate was issued only
once, and that was done prior to first occupancy, subsequent decay making
the buildings unsound would not be a circumstance that would authorize
rent withholding if the buildings had been lawfully occupied in the
beginning.
The other provision which might have been interpreted to permit
tenant-initiated enforcement stated simply that "an action may also be
brought and proceedings taken for the enforcement of this act by any
taxpayer." The language "any taxpayer" left unclear whether suit had to
be brought by a person who was adversely affected by the existence of the
violation.
Of the four remedies for coercing compliance, the one most likely to be
chosen by the enforcing official but the least likely to be effective was the
criminal sanction. This choice was popular chiefly because it was con-
venient: no building official or city attorney ever had the time to draft the
lengthy pleadings needed to institute court proceedings for equitable relief.
There was, however, another reason for not using other available remedies:
the constitutionality of the section providing for hearings by the local
legislative body and the subsequent undertaking of repairs to be secured by
lien was doubtful. Notice of hearings could be provided by personal
service or by certified mail sent to the last known address of the owner.
Failure to receive the certified mail, however, would not affect the validity
of the proceedings nor was any minimum time for giving notice set,
although notice was to be posted in a conspicuous place on the dwelling
seven days before the hearing. The failure to distinguish between resi-
dential and non-residential owners, to require personal service on residential
owners, and to provide a minimum time for giving notice would constitute
lack of procedural due process today.
B. The 1968 Amendents
Remedying the inadequacy of the existing law meant specification of the
procedures to be used by enforcing officials and the courts in securing
compliance: delegation of enforcement authority, methods of inspection,
a warrant procedure for gaining entrance to premises, requirements for
issuance and suspension of certificates of compliance, and procedures to be
followed where violations were noted. A step-by-step, chronological order
was set out for law enforcement officials so that they would not mistake
what was required of them.9
The innovations were devised in the area of coercive remedies. Under
the prior law criminal prosecution of the violators as misdemeanants had
been favored and had proved overwhelmingly unsuccessful. Cases were
adjourned interminably, and when fines were imposed they were rarely
9 MICH. COMP. LAWS §125.525-533 (1968).
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large enough to do more than touch the offender's purse. All criminal
sanctions were omitted from the new law, as reliance was placed on the
ability of the court of general trial jurisdiction to compel compliance
through the exercise of its equity powers. After hearing the matter the
court, in appropriate circumstances, may issue a mandatory injunction,10
appoint a receiver," or authorize the local unit of government to make the
repairs.' 2 If repairs are undertaken by a receiver or by the local unit of
government, the court is given the power to grant a lien against the "real
property" for costs and expenses of the receivership and for the expenses
of repair and renovation.13 In the order granting the lien the court may
also establish the priority of the lien, except that it may not be senior to
tax and assessment liens, nor to any mortgage lien which "has a recording
date prior to all of their liens of record . . . if, at the time of recording
such mortgage or at anytime subsequent thereto, a certificate of com-
pliance . . . is in effect on the subject property." 14
Presumably the relief described in the preceding paragraph could have
been obtained under the prior law, which provided for bills of complaint,
petitions, and applications to the circuit court and chancery for injunctions
or for an "order granting the relief for which said action or proceeding is
brought." What is innovative in the new law is the right which is given to
an occupant of premises upon which a violation exists to bring an action
in his own name for enforcement. If a local enforcing agency applies to
the court, or the occupant-plaintiff gives a notice of request, the enforcing
agency may be joined with or substituted for the occupant as a plaintiff.'
5
The occupant having filed his complaint is also given the right to apply to
the court for authorization to make repairs and deduct the expense thereof
from his rent payments.1 6
The common law cause of action which the lessee might bring against
his lessor for damages and injunctive relief for breach of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment has been expanded. The lessee now has a statutory right
of action against the owner where a violation of the housing law which
the owner is obligated to correct interferes with the use and occupation of
the premises. 17
At least one innovation proved too strong for a citizens committee' S
which reviewed the bill prior to its introduction in the Legislature. As
initially drafted, the bill provided for an affidavit by the owner which
10 ld.
"lId., §125.535 (1968).






1.SThe New Detroit Committee, formed after the 1967 Detroit riots to inquire into
the causes of the disturbances and suggest cures.
[Vol. 2:1
Tenant Rights
would be attached to the documents of transfer and would state known
code violations; if the premises were believed to be free of violations, the
affidavit would have to state that there were no violations. No deed would
have been entitled to record unless such affidavit were attached. If a trans-
fer were completed without compliance with the affiidavit requirement, it
would have been voidable at the option of the transferee within twelve
months from the date of exchange.
IV. Leasehold Covenants Obliging the Landlord to
Maintain the Premises
It is arguable that, prior to the enactment of the 1968 legislation in
Michigan, a duty was imposed on the landlord both by case law1 9 and
statute2 0 to put the premises in habitable condition before the tenant
takes possession and to keep them in good repair throughout the term of
the tenancy. But one old case and a statute honored more often in the
breach than in the observance did not establish precedents in which the
tenant could place his confidence. Furthermore, another statute prohibited
the implication of covenants in conveyances of real property2 1 such as
leases; as a consequence, only with great hesitation would one expect to
persuade a trial judge that Michigan courts recognized an implied covenant
of fitness in leases of residential property.
Under the new statute2 2 the occupant of rented housing, whether a
lessee or a licensee, has the benefit of two covenants which will be found
in every rental agreement. The first covenant is in effect a warranty that
the premises are fit for the uses intended by the parties at the time of
taking possession. The second is in effect a promise of future performance
and states that the lessor or licensor covenants to keep the premises in
reasonable repair during the term of occupancy and to comply with all
applicable health and safety laws. An exception to the landlord's obligation
under the second covenant is created where the "disrepair ... is caused by
the tenant's willful or irresponsible conduct or lack of conduct." 23 Even
though the State Housing Law imposes on the owners of all dwellings a
general duty to repair, 24 that obligation ordinarily does not give rise to
implied or constructive contractual obligations on which the tenant may
rely. Therefore it was felt necessary to establish as a matter of law the
landlord's promissory duty to make the premises fit for habitation at the
time of taking possession and throughout the term or period of the tenancy.
The rule of caveat emptor is clearly rejected, for the statute provides
19 Leonard v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 577, 41 N.W. 695 (1889).
2
° MICH. Comip. LAWS, §125.471 (1968).
21 id., §565.5 (1968).
22 1d., §554.139 (1968).





that the right of a prospective occupant to inspect the premises before
concluding the agreement, if exercised, does not imply a waiver of the
covenants.
V. Rights of Tenants in Public Housing
Legal relations between tenants and the project management of public
housing are governed by the law of landlord and tenant and by rules
imposed by the Housing Commission. Tenants are given a lease which
creates a tenancy from month to month, the tenancy for a term of years
being eschewed because of the difficulty in evicting occupants. Obtaining
an eviction is a relatively painless matter for the project administration
when the tenancy is periodic. Rules and regulations are made by the
project management and the Housing Commission; they tend to weigh
rather heavily on the tenants. Public housing is an assistance program, and
characteristically such programs leave recipients with little control over
the way in which benefits are administered.
The stimulation of fundamental changes in the administration of welfare
housing is the objective of the two statutes enacted by the Legislature in
this area. The first statute2 5 looks to the narrow problem of evictions, a
problem which can best be illustrated by a shocking example. Mrs. X and
Mrs. Y were tenants in a Detroit housing project, and Mrs. Y, the
daughter of Mrs. X, found herself the recipient of an eviction notice. The
project management contended that Mrs. Y had been letting unauthorized
persons use her apartment, and that during these illegal occupations Mrs.
Y stayed with her mother, Mrs. X, in her mother's unit. When it became
apparent that Mrs. Y was going to fight the eviction, notice was also given
to Mrs. X that her tenancy would be terminated. Mrs. X was an elderly
lady who had been a model tenant for sixteen uneventful years, and the
clear intimation from the management was that the notice to Mrs. X would
be rescinded if Mrs. Y would leave the project voluntarily.
There may be no eviction under the new act except for "just cause."
Illustrations of cause set out in the statute include failure to comply with
the obligations of the lease or the lawful rules and regulations of the
Housing Commission; the use of a unit for an unlawful purpose; the
maintenance of unsafe or unhealthful conditions on the premises; and
ineligibility for continued occupancy by reason of overincome.
The language of the act as passed should be contrasted with that of the
proposed bill which indicated that just cause would include "a repeated
failure to comply with the obligations of the lease . . . such as a failure
to pay successive installments of rent; the continued use of a unit for any
unlawful purpose." (emphasis added) As drafted the statute was intended




clearly indicated that repeated wrongdoing was the gravamen of cause for
eviction. Certainly one could expect breaches of such magnitude that one
occurrence would suffice to justify eviction: but such an eviction was not
forbidden by the proposed language. The draft, however, also ensured
that project management was not given a weapon against the tenant in the
form of termination for the slightest breach.
The second statute2 6 created Boards of Tenants Affairs, although the
initially intended application to all communities was ultimately limited to
communities of one million or more inhabitants, effectively excluding all
cities except Detroit. The act seeks to achieve three objectives. First, it
requires the local Housing Commission to adopt rules governing eligibility
requirements, obligations of tenants, conditions for continued occupancy,
the elements of cause for eviction, and such other rules and regulations as
are necessary to administer the local projects effectively. 27 Second, the
act provides for the organization of the Board. There are to be not less
than eight nor more than twenty members, one-half being elected by their
fellows from tenants and local projects, and one-half appointed by the
mayor of the local unit of government. 28 Third, the act sets forth the
powers of the Board: to advise the Housing Commission on matters con-
cerning the welfare of the tenants, to review and possibly veto rules of
the local Housing Commission, and to hear and determine complaints by
tenants or applicants for public housing arising from decisions of the
project management or Housing Commission. 29
In effect, the Board becomes a governing body sitting in judgment on
matters which directly affect the tenants, guiding decisions of the project
administrators, and proposing rules and regulations to the Housing Com-
mission. The act and the Board which it creates are perhaps accurately
characterized as hopeful experiments. There will remain in practice the
very serious question whether these tenants can become active participants
in the management of their daily affairs.
VI. The Summary Possession Law
A. Prior Law
The right of the landlord to regain possession of premises to which he
holds legal title without having to engage in extended litigation is un-
questionably the source of his greatest strength in contests with tenants.
Under prior law the landlord had the right to oust the tenant when the
tenant held over at the end of the term, or after notice to quit in the case
of periodic tenancies and estates at will or by suffrance; when the tenant
26 1d., §125.694(b), .699 et. seq (1968).
27 1d., §125.694(b) (1968).
281d., §125.700-.701 (1968).
29 1d., §125.702-.704 (1968).
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held over contrary to the terms or conditions of his lease; when rent had
come due and the landlord's obligation to demand payment was waived
in writing; and when rent came due and the tenant refused to pay or
relinquish possession of the premises for seven days after notice to quit.
Actions were brought before a court of limited jurisdiction and were
tried there so long as title to the premises was not in issue. The complaint
was abbreviated, merely setting forth the statutory grounds showing the
plaintiff was entitled to relief. By way of defense the defendant pleaded
orally in open court: "guilty" or "not guilty." As framed by the denial the
issues were whether the plaintiff was the proper party to seek possession;
whether proper notice had been given to terminate the periodic tenancy,
or whether the term was at an end; whether the defendant had paid the
rent; and whether the defendant was in possession. Affirmative defenses,
other than the defense of partial eviction, were not permitted. For centuries
the rule was that covenants in a lease were independent and that a breach
of the landlord's covenant to repair, for example, did not give the tenant
a right to withhold his rent. He had to pay the rent when due and then
sue for damages; of course, any tenant who sued his landlord for damages
could expect to receive a notice to quit by the end of the next period. If
the defendant had a valid claim for damages against the landlord, that
claim could not be heard by the same tribunal hearing the claim for
possession and no counter claims were permitted. If the tenant should
lose and the court should order a writ of restitution to issue, the tenant
could appeal as a matter of right to a court of general trial jurisdiction for
a de novo hearing. However, this right was limited in the most absolute
and conclusive way by a provision that required an appeal bond in an
amount equal to nine times the monthly rental. For a tenant who had
difficulty in scraping together one month's rent from period to period, the
making of a cash deposit of nine months' rent was impossible. The
cash bond was the only alternative: no surety would post the bond for
any premium and the court never permitted a personal bond.
B. 1968 Amendments
The changes enacted in the Summary Possession Law were directed at
the single objective of extending duration of the tenancy by making it
possible to delay the execution of a writ of restitution for long periods.
Appeals alone add nearly a year to the normal ten days grace period,
while the landlord is not harmed since the changes in the law permit the
court to require monthly rental payments as a condition for continuing the
appeal without a cash bond.30 The duration problem has been met and
settled in the case of public housing. No action may be brought under
the statute unless the landlord alleges the reasons why the action is
30 Id., §600.5670 (1968).
[Vol. 2:1
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brought and further refers to law or to rules of the Housing Commission
which support his claim that just cause for the eviction existed. 3 '
Aside from the tactics of delay, however, the amended Summary
Possession Law permits defenses not previously available to the tenant.
If the landlord can be shown to have terminated the tenancy for any of a
number of prohibited reasons, this will constitute an absolute defense and
judgment will be entered for the defendant. 3 2 The defense has the added
effect of increasing duration in some small measure as the instances in
which the landlord may lawfully terminate the tenancy are curtailed. The
amending act also permits the assertion of the affirmative defense of failure
of a constructive condition precedent, a defense long recognized in contract
doctrine. The prior legal doctrine of independence of covenants in the
lease was thus substantially modified. The tenant need only persuade the
court that the failure of the landlord to repair, if that is the case, is a
substantial breach of contract, giving rise to a failure of a constructive
condition precedent to the duty to pay rent. Since a statutory covenant
to repair is implied, the task of persuasion should not be difficult.
The new section of the Summary Possession Law implicitly recognizes
these statutory covenants as it permits that "the defendant may state such
defenses as he may have upon the lease or contract, or against the
opposing party."3 3 Extended pleadings are now permitted, as the law
states that "the defendant may file any responsive pleading permitted by
the court rules." 34
Other affirmative defenses are set out in the amending act which may be
pleaded in defense to a suit for possession whether brought to collect rent
or to evict a holdover tenant after notice to terminate. The tenant will
prevail if he can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
termination was intended as a penalty for attempting to secure rights under
the lease or agreement, or under the laws of the state or of the United
States; or as a penalty for making a complaint of unsafe or unsanitary
housing conditions to an appropriate governmental agency; or as retribution
for any other lawful act arising out of the tenancy (such as organizing a
tenants' council),. 5
The difficult bond requirements for the right of appeal have been lib-
eralized. The penalty of the bond is now to be fixed at a reasonable
amount. If the appellant cannot obtain sureties or make a cash deposit,
he may have the bond without sureties of cash deposit and upon reason-
able conditions determined by the court,3 6 including the possibility of
monthly rental payments to the landlord.
31Id., §600.5637 (1968).
:12 Id., §600.5646 (1968).
:13 Id., §600.5646(3) (1968).
34 ld., §600.5646(2) (1968).
3.' Id., §600.5646(4) (a)-(c) (1968).
36 Id., §600.5670 (1968).
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A provision was added by the Legislature which should be carefully
noted, as it could become oppressive for tenants who are living in deteri-
orated housing. The amending act provides that if a tenant causes a
serious and continuing health hazard or physical injury to the premises
and refuses to restore the premises or deliver up possession within seven
days, he will be subject to eviction.
3 7
